ABSTRACT. While the social capital theory, popularized by Putnam, expects that associational life and social trust promote civic participation in political processes, some studies have demonstrated weak associations between social capital and political engagement. By applying these arguments of the limited impact of social capital, this study examines the relationship between social capital and political trust in South Korea. Survey data were analysed and it was found that both associational involvement and social trust were negatively related to trust in political institutions and commitment to voting. Furthermore, these negative relationships were mediated by citizen perceptions of poor institutional performance such as political corruption, suggesting that institutional performance is a crucial determinant of political engagement.
Introduction
In the closing decades of the 20th century, dynamic political processes were unfolding all around the globe. Some of them were blessings, but others raised a great amount of concern. One of the serious concerns that absorbed public attention at the turn of the century was the political alienation of citizens. Scholars and politicians have, at the same time, woken up to the increasing tendency of citizen disengagement from institutional politics, so serious that one might diagnose it as political stagnation. Social capital theory stands out in this regard. Popularized by Putnam -although its theoretical foundations date back to the late 19th century when De Tocqueville wrote about American democracy -social capital theory has significant implications for political reinvigoration, thereby calling for a great deal of scholarly attention. Social capital is believed to mobilize alienated citizens and lubricate political operations in society (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993 Putnam, , 1995a Putnam, , b, 2000 .
Social capital theory emphasizes two principal components: one, social networks established by associational engagement such as voluntary organizations, and the other, reciprocal norms and trust between citizens. At first glance, one might conclude that there is not much that is novel about Putnam's thesis: pluralist theories in the 1960s and social movement theories in the 1980s had all identified the positive impact of social groups, such as interest groups and civic organizations, on the facilitation of political participation. Perhaps the distinctiveness of social capital theory is that it extracts political consequences from nonpolitical social interactions (Norris, 2002: 137) . Social capital theory focuses on a broad spectrum of social groups, including the strong ties of family and friends, community involvement such as the Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs) and religious services, and hobby and leisure societies. All these groups are believed to function as schools providing civic skills and generally to reinvigorate political life, in one way or another. Moreover, the most remarkable theorization of social capital lies with trust. Social networks are said to elicit reciprocal norms and trust in other people, and such trust is considered another core element of political revitalization and effective governance, resulting in democratic stability (Putnam, 1993 (Putnam, , 1995a (Putnam, , b, 2000 .
For all the public appraisals of the potential contribution of social capital theory to real-world politics, however, the fact that the theory regards non-political social interactions as a significant antecedent of political revitalization has caused a great deal of scholarly debate. Most of the criticisms have converged on the political implications of social capital, with arguments that the political aspect of civicness needs to be distinguished from the social one. Scholars have revealed empirical differences between social and political trust; they have also revealed weak associations between voluntary associational involvement and political participation (Foley and Edwards, 1999; Kaase, 1999; Levi, 1996; Navarro, 2002; Newton, 1999 Newton, , 2001 Norris, 1996 Norris, , 2002 Uslaner, 2002) . Conceptually, it is argued that the terms used in social capital theory are too extensive, and that political capital needs to be separately termed (Harwood and Lay, 2001 ). According to these criticisms, Putnam's thesis weighs too heavily on exclusively social activities in identifying the political implications of civil society, and overstates the political consequences of social capital.
The general concept of trust is especially troublesome. Social capital theory, by illustrating the matching trends between social trust and voting turnout, asserts that the decline of social trust between citizens has a bearing on the decline in electoral participation. The regeneration of social trust is, therefore, believed to increase voting turnout and other modes of civic participation in politics (Putnam, 1995b: 675) . However, to expect a revival of civic participation in conventional politics such as voting, trust in political institutions rather than the generalized social trust is presumably a necessary condition. While in a recent version of his work Putnam states that political trust is different from social trust (Putnam, 2000: 137) , little focus has been given to theoretically and empirically differentiating political trust from social trust and to finding out how the former is related to the latter. Rather, this trend of research, by postulating associational involvement as a direct cause of political revitalization in the light of participatory democracy, disposes people to presume a positive relationship between social capital and political trust.
This article examines the relationship between social capital and political trust in South Korea, asking the question of whether social capital does indeed significantly contribute to political engagement. Two primary motivations lie behind this study. First, although associational involvement invigorates trust in the general population of society, the generalized social trust is not automatically transformed to become trust in political institutions. Political revitalization is not an outgrowth of social trust, and it seems more feasible to consider that there are factors intervening between social capital and political outcomes rather than to anticipate social trust as a direct cause of political results. Due to the excessive emphasis given to social trust by social capital theory, the factors intervening between social and political trust, which might be more important ingredients of political revitalization, have been more or less obscured.
Secondly, while a considerable amount of work has been conducted on social capital in established democracies, focusing on the USA and European countries, only a few studies have examined social capital in the context of consolidating democracies (Blomkvist, 2001; Fox, 1996; Seligson, 1999) . Although the social capital thesis is widely accepted in many countries, including the USA, which is the home of the theory, little empirical evidence exists to support its generalizability across varying countries. It would thus be worth raising a question of whether the social capital thesis is invariably applicable to those countries whose levels of democracy and civil society are different from the home of the social capital theory. In an attempt to identify the differential impacts of associational involvement on social and political trust and the relationships of social capital to political engagement (political trust and commitment to voting), this article applies the ongoing arguments of social capital to South Korean politics.
The relationship between social capital and political trust
A number of studies, originating in the Tocquevillian tradition of civic volunteerism, have suggested that voluntary organizations and associational activities are conducive to eliciting generalized social trust. These studies emphasize the importance of social trust in generating co-operative relations between individual citizens, eventually yielding vibrant civil society and political reanimation (Almond and Verba, 1963; De Tocqueville, 1969; Inglehart, 1990; Ostrom, 1990; Verba et al., 1995) . Putnam's (1993 Putnam's ( , 2000 social capital theory is in line with this array of cultural theories (Jackman and Miller, 1996; Mishler and Rose, 2001) . The problematic aspect of generalized trust in relation to political participation in the cultural theories, however, is that the complicated nature of trust is being oversimplified. In particular, the studies suggest that political trust evolves from the same origins as social trust: the argument is that political trust, like social trust, is fundamentally grounded on, and generated by, interpersonal trust, formed by socialization early in life as well as by cultural norms. According to this perspective, political trust, like social trust, appears to be an outgrowth of vibrant associational life in society (Almond and Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 1990; Ostrom, 1990; Putnam, 1993; Verba et al., 1995; see Mishler and Rose, 2001 , for a discussion of cultural theories).
Admittedly, however, the bulk of the evidence, if anything, suggests that political trust is not always positively related to the components of social capitalassociational involvement and social trust. Moreover, there are empirical findings of a weak association between social and political trust. For example, Newton and Norris (2000) found that, by analysing pooled data on 17 established democracies, correlations between social trust and confidence in public political institutions were very weak. Kaase (1999) also demonstrated that interpersonal trust was only weakly associated with political trust in all nine European countries in his analysis; he concluded that interpersonal trust "cannot assume the role of an important antecedent to political trust" (p. 14). Similarly, a series of studies found evidence that social and political trust are not always closely related, but rather they hinge on different mechanisms of formation and operation (Craig, 1993; Uslaner, 2002: Ch. 5; Wright, 1976) .
The evidence of the not-so-significant relationship between social and political trust in turn raises a question mark on the positive relationship between associational activities and political trust. Considering the fact that a majority of people are not engaged in voluntary and associational activities, and that even those participating people spend only a limited amount of time in such activities, it is hardly plausible to expect a significant contribution from such associations in facilitating political trust (Newton, 1999 (Newton, : 172, 2001 . In fact, it has been found that political trust, especially confidence in institutions, is not significantly associated with voluntary activism (Newton and Norris, 2000: 63-4) .
Furthermore, Brehm and Rahn's (1997) study of social capital provides a basis for arguing that associational involvement is even negatively related to political trust: they found that an increase in civic engagement in associations resulted in lower confidence in national political institutions in the USA. Although Brehm and Rahn's hypothesis was drawn from De Tocqueville's pluralistic view of civic associations as resisting "the temptations of centralization" (p. 1004), the particular result of the negative relationship in and of itself could involve different interpretations. One might argue that, unlike the prevalent assumption of the spill-over effects of civic associations, the reality is that members of associations may be more inclined to focus on their instrumental goals. Associations "are not particularly useful agents of the kinds of sanctions and information that are necessary to promote large-scale economic exchange. Nor is it clear that they produce norms of reciprocity with those outside the club; in fact, they may have just the opposite effect" (Levi, 1996: 47) . Given that there are studies arguing that associations -or at least some of them -are extraneous to promoting political participation (Babchuk and Edwards, 1965; Rogers et al., 1975) , it would be inappropriate to suggest that all forms of associations yield an identical pattern of political engagement (Boix and Posner, 1998; Eastis, 1998; Pollock, 1982; Seligson, 1999; Stolle and Rochon, 1998) . 1 The search for a rationale to explain why social capital could be negatively related to political trust sheds light on what seems to be missing in the social capital theory in terms of identifying more critical determinants of political trustcitizen perception of institutional performance. Studies suggest that political trust is more significantly related to political factors than to social variables such as income, education, social position, and life satisfaction, upon which social trust is contingent (Abramson, 1983; Lawrence, 1997; Newton, 1999; . 2 Among the various political factors, it is performance of political institutions that most significantly influences citizens' political trust. 3 Political trust hinges on citizens' rational evaluations of institutional performance, and the level of such trust in government is highly associated with government performance (March, 1988; North, 1990; Uslaner, 2002; see Mishler and Rose, 2001 , for a discussion of institutional theories). As Newton (2001) notes, political trust is "not an 196 International Political Science Review 26 (2) expression of a basic feature of 'trusting personalities', but an evaluation of the political world. This makes trust scores a litmus test of how well the political system is performing in the eyes of its citizens" (p. 205). A great number of studies have indeed illuminated that performance of political institutions, notably including political corruption, is a critical factor in determining the level of citizens' political trust (Cusack, 1999; Della Porta, 2000; Miller and Listhaug, 1999; Otake, 2000; Pharr, 2000) . Provided that associational life leads to exposure to public life and political stimuli in one way or another, there could be a greater likelihood of associational participants perceiving national problems seriously. Political perceptions of such negative aspects of institutional performance -such as corruption for example -would then lead to distrust in political institutions and disengagement from institutional politics. In any event, the impact of poor institutional performance is greater when it comes to people with a high level of social trust, given that "the cooperative spirit underlying trust stands in stark contrast to the harsh realities of political life" (Uslaner, 2002: 202) . This intervening factor of institutional performance results in the possibility that people with a high stock of social capital are less likely to trust political institutions and less likely to become involved in the political world. Specifically, the fact that political trust is determined by institutional performance poses another important distinction from social trust: whereas social trust and social capital, which are shaped by cultural norms and values, are longterm forces, trust in political institutions can be altered in a short period due, in part, to short-term fluctuations of institutional performance (Norris, 1999: 217-18; Uslaner, 2002: 151) . This distinction is especially important in that it appears to be unwise to primarily rely on social capital to remedy the decline in political trust in accordance with fluctuating political matters, given that it is a difficult task to shape a stock of social capital in a short period. A more efficient solution is to focus on improving institutional performance in order to revitalize citizens' trust in political institutions because such a long-term force as social capital barely yields immediate political outcomes.
Nonetheless, it is necessary to mention that the political results of the negative relationship between social capital and political trust may not always be pessimistic. While people with low political trust are in general likely to disengage from the political arena, some of them might turn to alternative means of political expression. Kaase (1999) , for instance, found that lower political trust leads to more active involvement in non-institutionalized political participation. Sometimes, it is distrust in political institutions that yields citizens' active political action in so far as political efficacy is intact (Gamson, 1968 (Gamson, , 1971 ; see also Uslaner, 2004) . From this point of view, then, it might be the case that some of the associational participants who distrust government and parties turn away from institutional politics, and instead seek alternative means of political engagement, whereas most of them remain completely apathetic about politics. Although the present study does not address this issue of alternative political action, but rather focuses on political engagement in conventional politics, it is important to note that there could be the dual consequences of political distrust among associational participants.
Social capital and political performance in South Korea
A closer look at a country's political context provides additional explanations for the negative relationship between social capital and political trust. South Korea is KIM: "Bowling Together" isn't a a new democracy that experienced an authoritarian regime for a long time in its history. It was in 1987 that a competitive presidential election was first introduced after many years of military-backed dictatorship. In 1992, the first civilian president was elected to take office. Although Korea achieved miraculous economic development during its authoritarian phase, the level of democratization was very low. Nevertheless, the desire of citizens for democracy was fierce, and in the wake of anti-government demonstrations and protests by civic dissidents, constitutional changes were effected, bringing in free competitive presidential elections and other features of democratic transformation. Since the early 1990s, Korea's political reform has progressed so rapidly that its Freedom House rating of political rights and civil liberties is "now the equal of that of Greece and Chile, and above that of Argentina, Brazil, the Philippines and such post-communist democracies as Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Russia" (Rose et al., 1999: 150) . 4 Furthermore, evidence of a developing vibrant civil society is provided by the evolution of civic associations over the past decade. As shown in Figure 1 , the number of civic associations in South Korea has steadily increased. In 1993, a total of 46,593 associations existed; by 2001 that had leapt upwards by almost 51 percent, resulting in 70,151 associations around the country. Having said that, however, the political effects of the growth in civic associations were quite minor, as shown, for instance, by the trend in voting turnout over the same period. As illustrated in Figure 2 , the number of voters who participated in presidential, parliamentary, and local elections gradually decreased. South Korean politics, unexceptionally, reflects the worldwide trend of declining voting turnout, which is more frequently observed in advanced industrial societies. These contrasting trends of increasing civic associations and decreasing electoral participation, albeit only a macro-level comparison, suggest a need to assess the findings of a not-sosignificant relationship between associational membership and political participation (Norris, 2002: 160-1) .
Speculating about the rationale behind this phenomenon refers us back to our preceding argument regarding the influence of political performance. The 
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Source: Korea National Statistical Office decline of voting participation is apparently a reflection of waning trust in political institutions, and as mentioned earlier, citizens' evaluations of institutional performance are directly related to the level of their political trust (Cusack, 1999; Newton, 1999 Newton, , 2001 Uslaner, 2002) . The notion that political trust hinges on citizen evaluation of government performance would be more consequential in new democracies, especially in those countries with historical experience of political dislocation: as is evident in most new democracies, citizens have witnessed an alteration of regimes from the former undemocratic systems to the present democratic ones. The regimes in which political trust was nurtured by the cultural influence of early-life socialization no longer exist, and there might be a conflict between socialization and the performance influence of a current regime. In this circumstance, it is likely that the influence of institutional performance on political trust supersedes cultural influence (Diamond, 1999; Mishler and Rose, 2001: 31-2) . In particular, there is one issue that has consistently dampened trustworthy and effective governance in South Korea -political corruption. Korea is no exception to widespread concern over political corruption, which is also observed in established democracies (Della Porta, 2000; Otake, 2000; Pharr, 2000) . According to the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index based on surveys conducted in 2003 (www.transparency.org), South Korea was ranked fiftieth among 133 countries. Compared with other newer semi-and non-democratic societies, Korea was still behind 22 other countries. 5 The fight against corruption has been a primary election agenda at both national and local levels, and corruption scandals of public officials feature in most headlines of the mass media. Political corruption in South Korea is a critical factor that hinders the country's democratic development as well as trust in governance. Given this circumstance of pervasive corruption, citizen evaluation of poor political performance would override any positive impact of associational activities. Moreover, the influence of political corruption as an intervening factor leading people with a high stock of social 
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Source: Korea National Statistical Office capital to distrust political institutions appears to be more crucial, considering a theoretical account of social trust that is seen to have moral foundations. Uslaner (2002) argues that generalized social trust is fundamentally an abstract sense of tying-in with anonymous others based on the belief that they partake in "moral values" (p. 18). Following this account, it is likely that people with high social trust are more sensitized to the immoral conduct of politicians, and this in turn magnifies the impact of perceptions of poor political performance on trust in institutions.
Another explanation for the negative relationship between social capital and political engagement stems from the characteristics of associational life in Korea, which are affected by the level of democracy. Civic associations in Korea are essentially in the developmental stage. Under authoritarian regimes, associational life is likely to be closed, restricted, and passive, rather than open, liberal, and vibrant. While the level of democracy has advanced far in South Korea, cultural transition is, in general, slower than structural transition, and it is likely that the legacy of cultural norms brought about during the former regimes still remains in every corner of public life. Consequently, civic associations in South Korea might not be mature enough to provide the civic skills required for democratic citizenship. Although associations might be sufficiently socially inclusive to embrace anonymous others in society rather than exclusively focusing on their instrumental goals, this does not necessarily entail significant political implications. While it is believed that associational life stimulates political participation because exposure to public life and the practice of social skills upgrade citizens' political qualities (Putnam, 1993 (Putnam, , 2000 Verba et al., 1978) , this line of argument is generally based on the circumstances of established democracies and it is not always applicable to associations in new democracies. Indeed, it has been argued that, in undemocratic regimes such as the former Soviet Union, social networks could have an "inverse relationship" with trust in political institutions, such that "people use trusted networks to insulate themselves from distrusted state institutions" (Mishler and Rose, 2001: 35; Rose, 1995; Shlapentokh, 1989) . Such political legacy seems, at least in part, to characterize social groups in South Korea as being rather exclusionary of political institutions, which in turn reduces the likelihood of active engagement in institutional politics.
In sum, it is hypothesized that associational involvement and social trust are negatively related to political engagement (voting participation and political trust). While associational activities might lead to a strengthening of generalized social trust, there is no direct link between vibrant civic associations and the building of citizen trust in political institutions. The spill-over effects of associational involvement, going beyond social boundaries, are not always evident. Furthermore, as illustrated earlier, citizen evaluation of institutional performance in terms of political corruption and other major political issues is an important factor that determines the level of political trust. Presumably, citizens who seriously perceive poor performance of political institutions are more likely to be disengaged from politics and to have lower political trust. This intervening factor of political perception is seen to account indirectly for the negative relationship of social capital to political trust in South Korea.
Data and Analysis
This study analyses national survey data on social capital in South Korea. The survey was commissioned by the Government Information Agency, one of the 200 International Political Science Review 26 (2) South Korean government departments, and was conducted by the research organization, World Research. 6 A multi-stage stratified random sampling method was employed to select 1,500 respondents representing the South Korean adult population aged 18 and over, residing in family households at the time of the survey. Face-to-face interviews were conducted between November 23 and December 7 in 2001, and a total of 880 interviews were satisfactorily completed. For the current analysis, non-responses to questions relating to the primary variables of interest were deleted, and as a result, the number of valid cases for analysis was 850. Primary variables are described below. 
Associational involvement
Respondents were asked about their participation in associational activities. Among the 850 respondents, the total number of associational participants was 336. Given that the current analysis aims at examining the political consequences of non-political associations, those participating in political organizations were removed from the category of associational participants, leaving the number of associational participants as 330.
The categories of participating associations are shown in Table 1 : "social groups" comprise the greater majority of associations. Social groups, here, refer to social gatherings between people who share common backgrounds or interests, or social experience at one point in life; the category includes leisure societies, alumni groups, and regional community groups. Leisure societies can be regarded as an equivalent form of the main categories of civic associations in Putnam's study, such as "amateur soccer clubs, choral societies, hiking clubs, bird-watching groups, literary circles, hunters' associations, Lions Clubs and the like" (Putnam, 1993: 91) . Alumni groups and regional communities in Korea are extended relations of friends and neighbors respectively, and the main goal of their social gatherings is to promote friendship and common interests by face-to-face social interactions. Along with leisure societies, these two groups are among the most common forms of social relations in Korea; they represent community KIM: "Bowling Together" isn't a Cure-All 201 involvement for Koreans, which is functionally parallel to Putnam's PTAs and church-based groups (Putnam, 2000: 49) . In any event, it is useful to examine them in this study because the pattern of their interactions -at least in some cases -overlaps to a significant extent with the "informal social connections," which Putnam believes are important elements of social capital -"getting together for drinks after work, having coffee with the regulars at the diner, playing poker every Tuesday night, gossiping with the next-door neighbor, having friends over to watch TV, sharing a barbecue picnic on a hot summer evening" (Putnam, 2000: 93) . Given that the current study raises the question of whether such non-political relationships entail significant political impacts, the current measure of associational involvement satisfies the primary research purpose.
Social trust
Social trust was measured by aggregating two questions: (1) "When an emergency situation happens to you, how much sincere help would your neighbors give to you?" -with four response categories ("a great deal, somewhat, little, not at all"); and (2) "How much would you agree to the following statement -I feel comfortable living with other people?" -also with four response categories. 8 As a result, a 7-point scale has been created to represent social trust.
Political trust and commitment to voting
For political trust, a question asking how much the respondents trust parliament and parties was used. Parliament is the major institution of representative democracy, and therefore trust in parliament is considered the most valid measure of political trust. There are empirical and theoretical supports for the idea that trust in parliament is more fundamental in representing political trust, and the fluctuation of political trust indicates the change in the level of public trust in parliament (Newton, 2001: 205) . The responses to this question were measured by four-level alternatives ("a great deal, somewhat, little, not at all").
Commitment to voting was represented by the level of the respondents' agreement with the statement: "Election is very important and people should participate in voting." A four-level response category was given to the respondents, with the highest category "very much agree," and the lowest "not at all agree."
Perceptions of political performance
As stated earlier, one of the main arguments of this study is that citizens' evaluation of political performance intervenes between social and political trust. The more likely they are to perceive political institutions as poorly performing, the less likely they are to trust those institutions. To measure political perceptions, a question item asking: "What is the most serious problem in our society?" was used. Sixteen response categories including the major issues such as political corruption, poverty and the poor, inflation, social welfare, regional conflict, and several minor issues, were provided for respondents. The selection of political corruption, for instance, as the most serious problem, indicates that the respondents are likely to pay greater attention to it as a factor in the deterioration of healthier political conduct; they are more prone to negatively evaluate political performances because of political corruption, compared with those not choosing political 202 International Political Science Review 26 (2) corruption as the most important problem. Four dummy variables were created out of this question to represent four major issues which are critical determinants of citizen evaluation of political institutions: political corruption, inflation, poverty, and social welfare. For example, to measure perceptions of poverty, the respondents who selected the poverty issue were coded as 1 and all other respondents were coded as 0.
Trust in other social institutions
Meanwhile, as will be explained later, it is conceivable that trust or distrust in political institutions expressed by associational participants may reflect a general tendency of trust or distrust, regardless of types of institutions (i.e. associational participants are less trusting of not only political institutions but also of other nonpolitical social institutions). Therefore, it is worth examining the relationships between associational involvement and other types of social institutions as well. Fortunately, the current survey contains questions measuring the level of trust in various kinds of social institutions, including government civil service, the national courts, educational institutions, the army, religious organizations, medical institutions, the press, the police, social and civic organizations, and major companies (private enterprise). The examination of these various social institutions on their relationships with associational involvement will clarify the research questions relating to the political impact of associational life.
Results
The first stage of the analysis is to assess the impacts of social capital, political perceptions, and commitment to voting on political trust, by considering the proportion of the variance in political trust accounted for by each predictor variable. To this end, a hierarchical multiple regression analysis has been performed. Political trust was first regressed on the demographic factors, which were followed by associational involvement, social trust, political perceptions, and commitment to voting, in that order. The sequence was arrived at based on the theoretical consideration that associational activities lead to social trust, and political perceptions and commitment to voting intervene between social trust and political trust. The result of this analysis is shown in Table 2 . As hypothesized, associational involvement turned out to negatively influence political trust when demographic factors were taken into account (b = -.14, p < .05, see Model 2) . Although this result was estimated before applying the remaining variables, it is obvious that associational activities do not facilitate trust in political institutions. Moreover, Model 3 shows that the negative relationship was indeed mediated by social trust; social trust also negatively affects political trust and the effect is highly significant (b = -.21, p < .01). As the R 2 increase shows, social trust is one of the most influential predictors of political trust, solely explaining eight percent of the variance in political trust (∆f = 73.21, p < .01). Contrary to the common assumption that social trust is positively correlated with political trust, this result upholds the view that political trust comes into existence by a mechanism different from that of social trust. As stated earlier, trust in political institutions is more likely to be determined by political factors, and citizen perceptions of institutional performance are believed to mediate the negative relationship between social and political trust (Newton, 1999 (Newton, , 2001 .
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Model 4 demonstrates the impact of political perceptions on political trust. Among the four political issues, political corruption shows the largest effect (β = -.17, p < .01). As hypothesized, the corrupt conduct of politicians and public officials appears to be a significant factor that reduces citizen trust in political institutions. In addition, the issue of poverty was found to be another significant factor that erodes political trust (β = -.11, p < .01). The poverty issue seems to have absorbed public attention due to the recent economic crisis in 1997, as a result of which Korea had to rely on an International Monetary Fund loan. The economic crisis resulted in large-scale unemployment and the mass media frequently focused on the desperate lives of those without a job. In the eyes of citizens, therefore, the poverty issue has become an overt indicator of whether the government and political institutions are performing well. Finally, commitment to voting was added to the equation, and it was found to positively affect political trust (b = .08, p < .05). People who are strongly committed to voting tend to be more trusting of political institutions. It is more or less clearcut that electoral participation has a positive relationship with political trust given that political institutions of representative democracy operate by means of elections.
While the hierarchical analysis estimated the effects of predictor variables on political trust, it does not provide an overall picture of the causal relationships between the predictor variables. Therefore, in order to examine the causal relations between the factors influencing political trust, a path analysis has been conducted, and several trends are revealed by this path model (see Figure 3) . First, there is a contrasting trend between social trust and political trust in terms of their relationships with associational involvement. Associational involvement was found 204 International Political Science Review 26(2) to positively affect social trust (path coefficient = .15, p < .01), whereas it negatively influences political trust as already demonstrated by the hierarchical analysis (path coefficient = -.08, p < .05). Associations, as social capital theory contends, emerge to generate trust in anonymous others in society. However, the political consequences of trust-building activities of associations do not appear promising. Although trust in others, and society in general, is facilitated by weak ties of association, voluntary participation in civic associations neither promotes citizen trust in political institutions nor participation in elections (path coefficient = .02, p = .59). Secondly, citizens' political perceptions of institutional performance exert significant influence on the commitment to voting as well as on political trust. Those who considered political corruption, poverty, and social welfare to be serious problems were less likely to be committed to voting. Again, political corruption shows the largest effect among the variables of political perceptions (path coefficient = -.17, p < .01). This suggests that one of the factors behind declining voting turnout is the poor performance of political institutions. Citizens become disenchanted with politics because they are disgusted by corrupt politicians and dissatisfied with incompetent government and parties.
Thirdly, the negative relationships of social trust to political trust and commitment to voting are affected by citizens' perceptions of political performance. The paths passing through political perceptions show that social trust exerts negative influence on commitment to voting and political trust, due, at least in part, to the negative political perceptions. The indirect effects of social trust on commitment to voting and political trust via political perceptions were calculated in order to compare the relative contributions of the direct and the indirect effects to the total effects. For commitment to voting, the indirect effects through political perceptions made a substantial contribution, which is about 62 percent of the total effects of social trust. In other words, almost two-thirds of the variance in commitment to voting caused by social trust come from political perceptions. For political trust, the contribution made by the indirect paths leading through political perceptions is relatively small. The indirect effects of social trust via political perceptions contribute 12 percent of the total effects of social trust on political trust. This relatively small contribution made by the indirect effects indicates that the direct path of social trust accounts for the remaining large proportion of the variance in its relationship with political trust. In other words, to some extent, social trust in this path model directly exerts a negative influence on political trust without the effects of the intervening factors.
One additional way to explain the negative relationship between social trust and political trust is concerned with citizens' expectations, which are known to matter in the evaluation of government performance and the formation of trust and distrust in political institutions. For example Miller and Listhaug (1999) identified that distrust of government is associated with a high level of citizens' expectations of government performance in the United States, Norway, and Sweden. Citizens have democratic ideals of how government functions, and they are less likely to be trusting of government when they perceive it as falling short of their ideals. Although Miller and Listhaug focused on the established democracies, their findings also seem to transfer to newly-established consolidating democracies, as they contend (p. 216). Citizens in new democracies observed such political dynamics as regime change and party realignment and presumably they tend to hold high expectations of democratic performance from new regimes and political institutions: that is to say, there would appear to be a gap between citizens' ideals of how democracy works and the reality of what is happening in political institutions (see also, Rose et al., 1999) . Enhanced social trust via associational activities renders citizens more idealistic about representative democracy and such ideals bring about a rather negative evaluation of the practice of political institutions in reality, leading to distrust in political institutions.
Meanwhile, one might pose the question of whether citizen distrust is not confined to political institutions but is also observed in regard to non-political institutions. It might be the case that distrust of political institutions is an expression of general distrusting attitudes towards all-round types of social institutions. Put differently, associational participation might elicit negative sentiments towards the operation of societal institutions, regardless of the types of associations. Hence, the next analysis sought to examine the relationships between associational involvement and trust in various kinds of social institutions, inclusive of public and private ones. The relationships were estimated by bivariate correlations.
As Table 3 shows, distrust in political institutions among associational participants is not part of a general tendency to distrust societal operations; associational involvement was not significantly related to most non-political institutions. In fact, if anything, bivariate correlations reveal that associational activities might be a potential cause of the waning of support for the practice of representative democracy in South Korea. While associational involvement does not have a significant relationship with other social institutions, it was negatively related to national legal institutions, government civil service, and the police, in addition to parliament and parties. It is quite revealing that, among the various social sectors, it is to the three powers of the state that associational involvement is negatively related. That is, people involved in associational activities are more likely to be distrusting of political, governmental, and legal institutions. The crisis of representative democracy is often regarded as decreasing public support for representative institutions: administration, legislation, and the judiciary. Citizens
206
International Political Science Review 26 (2) turn their attention away from these institutions and, instead, either depend on alternative means of expressing an opinion, or remain completely silent and insulated. This study demonstrates that the applicability to South Korea of the social capital thesis that effective governance and political reanimation are fostered by associational activities is tenuous.
Discussion and conclusions
In sum, this study has analysed survey data on social capital in South Korea to identify the causal relationships between social capital (associational involvement and social trust) and political engagement (commitment to voting and political trust), by focusing on the intervening variables of political perceptions. The hierarchical regression and the path analysis demonstrated several findings worth discussing. First of all, consistent with the arguments of the limited impact of social capital (Foley and Edwards, 1999; Harwood and Lay, 2001; Kaase, 1999; Levi, 1996; Navarro, 2002; Newton, 1999 Newton, , 2001 Newton and Norris, 2000; Uslaner, 2002) , it was shown that social capital does not contribute to revitalizing civic participation in institutional politics in South Korea; both associational involvement and social trust negatively influenced trust in political institutions, and neither of them significantly increased commitment to voting. Secondly, political perceptions of institutional performance do indeed determine the levels of political trust and commitment to voting in South Korea. The perceptions of poor performance, such as political corruption and poverty, resulted in reducing the commitment to voting and trust in political institutions. Moreover, the negative relationships of social trust to voting and political trust were mediated by these political perceptions. It is obvious that citizens' evaluations of political performance play an important role in the relationship between social trust and political engagement. In particular, the effects of social trust on commitments to voting are strongly mediated by political perceptions, as revealed by the estimation of the indirect effects.
Finally, in questioning whether associational involvement is negatively related, particularly to political institutions, or whether it actually has negative relationships with other kinds of social institutions, bivariate correlations between associational involvement and various types of public and private institutions were KIM: "Bowling Together" isn't a Cure-All 207 conducted. The result demonstrated that associational involvement was negatively related to parliament and parties, government civil service, and the police, and the national courts, but not to all institutions. In other words, participants in associational activities are not cynical about society's institutional operations in general, but, rather, their distrust tends to converge on the core institutions of representative democracy: administrative (government civil service), legislative (parliament and parties), and the judiciary. Overall, the arguments of the limited impact of social capital (Foley and Edwards, 1999; Harwood and Lay, 2001; Kaase, 1999; Levi, 1996; Navarro, 2002; Newton, 1999 Newton, , 2001 Newton and Norris, 2000; Uslaner, 2002) were found to be a valid account for the relationship between social capital and political engagement in South Korea. Although their arguments are on the whole in line with Putnam's social capital theory, Brehm and Rahn's (1997) particular finding of the negative relationship between associational engagement and confidence in institutions also turned out to be applicable to social capital in South Korea. This study, consistent with those previous studies, suggests that social capital has a limited impact on political revitalization, at least in terms of conventional politics in South Korea. Although the scope of this study is limited to the South Korean case, the observed findings provide implications for examining social capital in those new democracies that share similar historical experience and political contexts.
As noted at the beginning, the rationale behind this study was to consider the puzzle over the political consequences of social relations illuminated in the social capital theory. Our findings confirm that Putnam's thesis and other supporting arguments for social capital are in fact correct, but only in the respect that associational involvement results in an increase of social trust. Civic associations are certainly of significant value; face-to-face social interactions and extended social relations nurture social trust among the general public in society. Civic associations appear to be, following Putnam's conceptualization, "bridging" networks that are inclusive of heterogeneous outsiders. Ultimately, the enhanced trust between citizens, in turn, facilitates civic co-operation and co-ordination for community development and the enrichment of civil society (Putnam, 1993 (Putnam, , 1995a (Putnam, , b, 2000 .
However, there seems to be little space for anticipating a positive political outcome from social trust in these causal relations. Contrary to the social capital thesis that social trust promotes citizens' political participation, social trust does not appear to be a direct cause of political revitalization: it was found that people with high social trust were less likely to be committed to voting and less likely to trust political institutions. While it is expected that associational participants trust their neighbors, attach themselves to the community, and become collaborative for social benefits, this stock of social capital does not necessarily result in a high level of political capital: social networks should not be regarded as involving significant political impacts. Although it is undeniable that social interactions are conducive to yielding vibrant political life in some respects, there is, however, apparently no positive connection between social trust and the enhancement of civic engagement in institutional politics.
Yet, there are limitations in this study which prevent the conclusion that associational involvement negatively influences citizens' political life, in all aspects. As mentioned earlier, citizens' disaffection with conventional politics does not necessarily mean the entire withdrawal from political spheres; they might be interested in alternative means of political activities to voice their opinions 208 International Political Science Review 26(2) (Gamson, 1968 (Gamson, , 1971 Kaase, 1999; Uslaner, 2004) . Whether the low political trust expressed by associational participants indicates the general tendency of political cynicism -or, indeed, attention to an alternative stream of political process -will remain unproved unless a comprehensive examination including various modes of political behavior is conducted. Unfortunately, the survey employed in this study does not contain measures of political behavior other than political trust and commitment to voting. Citizen disaffection with politics has been a serious public concern, and because it was believed to provide a key to the cure for the political alienation of citizens, social capital theory has absorbed an enormous amount of attention. Voluntary activism and social trust are undeniably civic virtues to be valued in democratic societies. Vibrant civil society apparently relies on how well citizens trust each other and co-operate for mutual social benefits. However, the popular focus on social networks and social trust has resulted in a relative belittling of other crucial factors such as the influences of political institutions and their performance. Without eradicating political corruption and improving institutional performance, social trust will be of no effect in terms of invigorating political life. If building social trust is one way to strengthen a healthier conduct of democratic politics, what is also necessary is an improvement in institutional performance, thereby increasing citizen support. Future scholarship is encouraged to focus on investigating how the intervening factors play a role in determining the impact of social capital on civic political life.
Notes
7. The question items of the current survey are comparable to non-Korean survey questions given that the question wordings of most items are identical with those universally used. For example, the item used to measure perceptions of political performance in this study is exactly the same as the one most popularly used in the surveys such as the General Social Surveys and the World Values Surveys. Only the questions that measure social trust and commitment to voting might contain slightly different wordings. However, their question wordings are straightforward and do not involve significant contextual variation. 8. Although most of the studies investigating social trust used the General Social Survey (and the World Values Survey) question item: "Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?", the current survey question items are believed not to yield a significant deviation from the GSS item. The questions of social trust in the current survey focus on weak-tie and thin trust, just as the contents of the questions used in other social capital research. An underlying logic is that if one gives a positive response to the questions of social trust in this survey, then one should also give a positive answer to the GSS question.
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